This is the third article in our series "The Hessians." Click here for a complete listing of all articles.
Our previous article in The Hessians uncovered the economic system known as the Soldatenhandel (Soldier Trade) in 18th-century Europe. This enabled Great Britain to rent auxiliary armies in times of military crisis, with eager German princes as willing suppliers of soldiers.
But what was it like to navigate this unique marketplace for rental armies? Exploring these challenges sheds light on how Great Britain ultimately selected six specific German principalities for rental agreements during the American Revolution. Why these six, and not others? In a world full of potential suppliers, what drew Britain to the German princes in particular?
When British officers embarked on their quest for auxiliary armies in 1775, they entered a veritable Supermarket for Soldiers teeming with options. Money was not an issue for them - the officers were told to spare no expense. Their strategy dictated a massive upfront expenditure to secure as many soldiers as possible, deploy them for a resounding victory in a single summer campaign, and then return them by year’s end (1). Armed with a blank check, the British entered the European Supermarket for Soldiers, eager to select the finest auxiliary armies available. They grabbed their cart, and went down aisle #1.
Aisle #1 - Russia
Surprisingly, Britain’s first preference for auxiliary armies wasn’t actually Germans, but rather Russian troops. Before the American Revolution, there were roughly 250,000 Germans living in North America. The largest community was in Pennsylvania, but there were also significant enclaves in Maryland, New Jersey, and New York (2). The British worried that if they sent German soldiers to America, those men could easily desert from the army and blend into the local German population. Major General Henry Clinton voiced this fear, saying “We must be reinforced, not with Germans, (I fear they will desert), [but with]. . . my friends the Russians. They have no language but their own; they cannot desert” (3).
The concern for minimizing desertion by hiring troops whose language was not widely spoken in North America led the British to court Catherine the Great, aiming to rent 20,000 Russian soldiers. However, they faced Russian reluctance. Catherine foresaw the American Revolution potentially entangling France and Spain, jeopardizing her lucrative trade with America. Additionally, she had recently quelled Pugachev's Rebellion in 1775 and craved a period of peace. Sending her war-weary troops across the ocean was not on her agenda (4).
Thus, in the Supermarket for Soldiers, the disappointed British left Aisle #1 with an empty cart, and continued their search down Aisle #2.
Aisle #2 - The Netherlands
The British then approached one of their traditional allies, the United Provinces of the Netherlands, for 1,800 soldiers. Specifically they asked to rent the Scotch Brigade, a unique unit that was technically part of the Dutch military, but many of the soldiers were British subjects. However the Dutch empathized with the American cause, seeing both themselves and the nascent American nation as fellow Republics. One Dutch statesman remarked that “A republic should never assist in making war on a free people” (5). In a compromise, the Dutch allowed the British to rent the brigade, but those soldiers could only serve in Europe, not in North America (6).
The British declined this offer - they urgently needed soldiers who could be swiftly deployed to North America, and they were running out of time.
Aisle #3 - The Holy Roman Empire
As British options dwindled, their focus shifted predominantly to German rulers, though not all of them were willing or able to provide soldiers for rent. Prussia’s leader Frederick the Great abhorred the Soldatenhandel, saying “This is an unbecoming trait in the character of a prince who sets himself up as a teacher of rulers. Such conduct is caused by nothing but dirty selfishness. I pity the poor Hessians who end their lives unhappily and uselessly in America” (7).
This constrained British efforts because the Duke of Wurttemberg offered troops to Britain, but in order to reach North Sea ports, those men would need to move directly through Prussian territory, something Frederick refused to permit.
In addition to political hindrances, some rulers offered troops of unsatisfactory quality. In 1776, British diplomat Hugh Elliot explored the possibility of renting troops from Bavaria, only to find that the Bavarian soldiers were very poorly trained and badly equipped. In his report to England, he wrote, “the Bavarian troops are the worst that I have ever seen in Germany” (8).
An additional major obstacle was the British necessity to send the auxiliary soldiers to America. For all German princes, this would be the first time their auxiliary armies would leave Europe. The long ocean voyage, vast distance from home, and unfamiliar continent all increased the likelihood that an unacceptable number of soldiers would not return. German princes earned vast sums with their rental armies, and the potential catastrophic loss of their primary source of revenue was deemed by several as too great a risk. (9)
The Checkout
With limited options and time running short, the British had to settle for German princes who met several specific criteria:
Princes who were willing to rent their armies for use in North America instead of the usual European battlefields.
Princes who actually had troops that passed minimum quality control standards.
Princes who could avoid political roadblocks and move troops through Europe to North Sea ports for transport to America.
This unique combination of factors resulted in only the six territories of Hessen-Kassel, Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel, Hessen-Hanau, Ansbach-Bayreuth, Waldeck, and Anhalt-Zerbst willing or able to sign rental agreements.
Their selections made, the British officers approached the check-out in the Supermarket for Soldiers. They had initially estimated they would require 20,000-25,000 auxiliary troops to crush the American Revolution, and after months of searching they had cobbled together roughly 21,600 soldiers in their cart to be sent to North America (this number would increase to roughly 30,000 by war’s end) (10).
At the cash register, they handed the German princes a check, which these rulers gladly accepted. In return, the princes issued Great Britain a receipt for their goods, which specified the terms of use for their auxiliary armies.
Achtung! Feuerbereit!
How much did the British pay?
What was expected of the soldiers in America, and of their rulers in Europe?
Most importantly, in any financial transaction, we always want to know who got the best DEAL.
Our next article will unpack all of these questions and more! Stay tuned :)
Sources & Notes
Atwood, Rodney. The Hessians. Cambridge University Press, 1980. 26.
Kamphoeffner, Walter D. Germans in America. Rowman and Littlefield Publishing, 2021. 18. & US Census from 1790.
Although numbers are impossible to determine with certainty, the census from 1790 indicates that at least 279,000 Germans were in the United States at that time, and Kamphoeffner sheds further light as to the distribution of these Germans before the 1790 census.
Atwood, 24.
Baer, Friederike. Hessians. Oxford University Press, New York. 2022. 8-9.
Wilhelmy, Jean-Pierre. Soldiers for Sale. Baraka Books, Montreal, 2009. 34-35.
Baer, 8-9.
Crytzer, Brady. Hessians. Westholme Publishing, 2023. xviii.
Kapp, Friedrich. Der Soldatenhandel Deutscher Fürsten nach Amerika. Berlin, 1864. 106
Baer, 13.
Krebs, Daniel. A Generous and Merciful Enemy. University of Oklahoma Press, 2015. 24.
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