Rent-A-Regiment
- Patrick Young
- Jan 21, 2024
- 5 min read
This is the second article in our series The Hessians. Click here for a listing of all articles.
Our previous article showed that Great Britain rented 30,000 German soldiers to help suppress the American Revolution. This article examines two subsequent questions: just why did Great Britain, one of the most powerful nations on earth, desperately need so many foreign soldiers? And why were German rulers willing to provide them?
The British Need for Soldiers
Under the blazing heat of a mid-June 1775 sun, 3,000 British soldiers in Boston readied for battle. Following their success at Lexington and Concord, Patriot forces had encroached upon Charlestown and occupied the nearby high ground on Bunker Hill, posing a grave threat to Boston’s security. The Battle of Bunker Hill unfolded with relentless waves of redcoat infantry assaulting the position until the patriots exhausted their ammunition and retreated. Although the British claimed victory, it was a pyrrhic one. They suffered 1,054 casualties, representing a staggering one-third of their entire force. Reflecting on the battle, British General Clinton remarked, “A few more such victories would have shortly put an end to British dominion in America” (1).
The Empire of Great Britain now faced an existential crisis. Their profitable 13 colonies were in open rebellion, and for both practical and ideological reasons this uprising needed to be crushed as soon as possible. One major obstacle stood in their path: the British did not have nearly enough soldiers to confront the growing American forces, and the action at Bunker Hill made this painfully clear.
Above, The Battle of Bunker Hill by Howard Pyle, 1897. In this image, redcoat bodies can be seen strewn across the field. The British suffered a staggering casualty rate of 33%.
To better understand why one of the most powerful nations on earth found itself in desperate need of foreign armies, it’s helpful to examine British troop dispositions at the time of Bunker Hill in 1775. See the map below (2).
When the American Revolution began, the entire British Army totaled 45,000 men worldwide (by comparison, the French army was 200,000 strong (3)). Since they only had 8,580 troops in all of North America, the 1,054 casualties at Bunker Hill represented an alarming portion of their forces on the continent. The British clearly had an undersized army for maintaining an oversized empire, but this was nothing new. They had always favored a small standing army, since their defensive advantage of being an island nation allowed their powerful navy to shoulder most of the military burden. A large army would have been a major expense that, most of the time, they just didn’t need (4).
That is, except in times of crisis.
Following Bunker Hill, British officials estimated they would immediately require 20,000-25,000 soldiers to end the rebellion (5). This represented a dramatic 50% increase in their army, and soldiers don’t just grow on trees. So where could they find that many men, and fast? There were two main options.
Option 1: Conscript soldiers at home in England.
This option was briefly considered, but discarded just as quickly. The British army was an all-volunteer force, and there was little appetite for mass conscription. Doing so would take most able-bodied men out of the labor market and damage their economy. In addition, it would require a very long time and a herculean effort to find, train, and equip over 20,000 raw recruits (6). Time was a luxury the British did not have. The longer they waited, the stronger the Americans became.
Option 2: Don’t have an army? Rent-a-Regiment!
General Gage (seen below) was the commander-in-chief of British forces in North America in 1775. He first recommended renting German troops in 1774 to stop a potential rebellion, suggesting that “to prepare for the worst, Hanoverians and Hessians may be hired, for by all appearances, these provinces must be first totally subdued before they will obey and a powerful force must be employ’d” (7).
Gage’s idea was neither original nor surprising. For over a century, the British (and in fact many other European countries) had made renting German armies into a routine enterprise. It allowed Britain to save money in times of peace, and pay for immediate access to large, professional, and pre-equipped auxiliary armies in times of war (8).
But just because the British desperately wanted soldiers…
Why were German princes willing to provide soldiers?
German principalities within the Holy Roman Empire were mostly small territories. They did not have a lot of wealth, they did not have any significant manufacturing operations, and they did not produce any valuable exports. But they did have one resource in abundance, and it was something that other war-prone nations desperately wanted to get their hands on - people.
German princes who maintained standing armies did so mainly to rent them to the highest bidders. The practice of leasing armed troops, known as the Soldatenhandel (soldier trade), began with Braunschweig renting soldiers to Venice in the 1660’s, and it continued into the 18th century. Over time it became a tried and true strategy for small princes to earn large profits (9).
What did they use the money for?
German princes used the money to maintain their armies, pay off debts, and improve their territories. For instance, Friedrich II of Hessen-Kassel built a museum, a foundling home, and a hospital with funds generated from the Soldatenhandel. Of course not all projects were altruistic, and some rulers used the money for their own personal expenses. In addition, not all subjects gained equally from social projects, since commoners in the countryside often provided the most soldiers but received the fewest benefits (10).
German princes constantly sought opportunities to rent their armies and generate revenue. Maintaining an army is expensive, and they could not possibly keep their armies funded without renting them on a regular basis (11). Some were so eager to lease their soldiers, in fact, that after Bunker Hill they offered their armies to the British before British officials had even asked for them. Prince Wilhelm I of Hessen-Hanau wrote enthusiastically to the king in 1775, saying that his soldiers were “all ready to sacrifice with me their life and their blood for your service” (12). The prince, of course, had no intention of going to America himself, but he had every intention of turning a profit.
The Brass Tax
In order to explain why Great Britain was able to rent German armies, we can boil everything down to basic supply and demand economics. Following Bunker Hill, the British desperately wanted soldiers and were willing to pay for them, and German rulers were more than willing to accept payment and provide them. The well-established system of the Soldatenhandel benefited both parties, and the marketplace for soldiers was alive and well. All that remained to do was iron out the terms of agreement, and decide on a fair price.
Achtung! Feuerbereit!
What’s it like to shop for an army? Hint: It’s not easy.
In our next article, we will accompany Great Britain to the Supermarket for Soldiers, and
examine how the British settled on renting armies from six specific German principalities. We will also look at what the expectations of German princes and soldiers were in these rental agreements.
And in any financial transaction, we also always want to know who got the best DEAL. Stay tuned :)
Sources
Bunker Hill Museum & American Battlefield Trust
Figures come from Curtis, Edward. The Organization of the British Army in the American Revolution. New Haven, CT. 1926. 3. Also available here. Map accessible here.
Crytzer, Brady. Hessians. Westholme Publishing, 2023. 274-275. xv.
Baer, Friederike. Hessians. Oxford University Press, New York. 2022. 6
Crytzer. xvi.
American Battle Trust, accessible here.
The Manuscripts of the Earl of Dartmouth. 226. Accessible here.
Atwood, Rodney. The Hessians. Cambridge University Press, 1980. 14, 11-12.
Krebs, Daniel. A Generous and Merciful Enemy. University of Oklahoma Press, 2015. 23-25. Atwood 33-34.
Ibid, 32-33.
Quoted in Lowell, Edward J. The Hessians. 2016 Edition. 13.
Atwood, 13-15.
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